Articles - Others - Date: 2025-09-21

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

In breaking news, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has signed a strategic defense pact with Pakistan, we say 'strategic' because, according to explanations from experts and media figures close to decision-making circles in both countries, the agreement stipulates extending Pakistan's nuclear resources to Saudi Arabi. Some sources added that Pakistani forces have already begun deploying to certain military sites near Mecca and Riyadh. This comes at a time when high-level meetings are in full swing between Tehran and Riyadh, with discussions that go beyond bilateral relations to encompass broader regional and international issues. These are important and 'qualitative' developments worth welcoming. If they represent a serious and strategic approach, rather than just bargaining chips, they will have major consequences, potentially contributing to reshuffling the cards, alliances, and balances on both the regional and international scenes.

Also in the news, but moving in the opposite direction, are reports that the UAE is exploring an 'upgrade' of strategic cooperation with India to the level of a mutual defense pact. A military delegation is visiting New Delhi to discuss details that could culminate in a summit, or meetings above the level of experts and military officials. The UAE, as we know, is bound together with India, the U.S., and Israel in the I2U2 Group framework, which may have moved beyond economics and transport into the realms of security and defense. These are worrying developments, both from the perspective of the Arab/Israeli conflict on the one hand, and the standpoint of Gulf security, stability, and unity on the other.

Not far from the Gulf, in Egypt, there is also remarkable, strategic movement taking place. Cairo's relations with Ankara have never been this warm, as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan put it, across multiple domains, as attested by joint naval drills. It was notably Cairo – not Muscat or Baghdad – that mediated between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency to conclude their most recent agreement. These are important developments, coinciding with the intensifying crisis between Egypt and Israel over the war on Gaza and its aftermath.

So what is happening 'behind these reports'? What is it that has stirred stagnant waters between influential and weighty capitals, drawing some closer to each other? What may unfold in the coming days? Will we see other Arab states hastening to seek alliances and protective umbrellas from active players, whether inside or outside the well-known club of 'international protectors'? These are questions of great interest to Arab public opinion, which we will strive to provide answers for in the following ten points:

First: It can be said with great certainty that most, if not all, Arab capitals in the 'Friends of the U.S.' club have become little to not at all trusting of the U.S. as a guarantor and protector. This feeling is not entirely new, though it was revived and deepened after Washington's complicit and supportive stance toward the Israeli attack against a key capital of moderation and mediation in the Arab world and an active and vital member of the 'Friends of the U.S.' club. That attack against Qatar would not have occurred in the first place without a green light granted to Tel Aviv behind closed doors. The truth that Trump tried to obscure with feeble smokescreens was blatantly exposed by the U.S. delegate at the Security Council, which blocked a resolution condemning the attack, allowing only a statement that passed with 14 votes in favor and Washington standing as the sole outlier. The U.S. also insisted on censoring the identity of the perpetrator, to the point one would think the heinous act against Hamas leadership in Doha had been committed by aliens from outer space.

Second: The Arabs do not trust one another, despite the exchanged kisses, warm receptions, and generous hospitality. They do not trust each other's intentions, nor the institutional frameworks meant to unite them, whether at the pan-Arab or regional level. More importantly, they harbor a deep conviction that even if they pooled their surplus strength, it would not be enough to protect their regimes and states. Their trust in the distant ally is far greater than in the close brother, and there are profound reasons for that that there is no room to detail here.

Third: The direction of these nations' search for 'patronage' and 'guarantee' has shifted this time; they have turned Eastward, in hope of finding what the West failed to provide. They have certainly reviewed episodes of Western abandonment of their regimes over the past 20 years. They do not see China as a haven or refuge, since it is not inclined toward mutual defense, especially if it is strategic. And Russia is not in a position to give them more than what it gave Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, or the many Arab allies before him. Moscow welcomes friendship and partnership, but when it comes to strategic joint defense, it has calculations that extend far beyond the region.

Fourth: The search for alliances and diversification is entirely legitimate and absolutely necessary, and has long been demanded by many experts and politicians in the region. But the way it is taking shape today entails hidden risks, including the 'Gulf-ization' of the India/Pakistan conflict. Two weighty Gulf states are taking sides between two countries whose relations have known nothing but tension, conflict, and wars since their independence from British colonization. The last military clash between them occurred only a few months ago. This, combined with the presence of large Indian and Pakistani communities in the Gulf, may create new troubles that the region hardly needs.

Fifth: Since weighty Arab states, including Egypt and especially Saudi Arabia, failed to secure a seat in the 'nuclear club' on flimsy pretexts and excuses, it may not be unreasonable for the Kingdom to seek shelter under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. But the question is still warranted, both before and after the agreement: Will Islamabad really provide such a shield, or is the agreement nothing more than a nuclear promise in exchange for investment and aid, only for Pakistan to find a way to justify withdrawal and retreat at the moment of truth?

Sixth: Before leaping outward in search of alliances and umbrellas, Gulf and Arab states should first have sought a pan-Arab project, reviving the Gulf and Arab defense pacts that have gathered dust in drawers. True, the Doha summit witnessed some chatter around these themes, the Gulf Joint Defense Council convened after the Doha aggression at the defense ministers' level, and joint military exercises are scheduled soon in an effort to build a so-called 'Gulf Iron Dome.' But no one has confidence that this path is serious or, more importantly, sustained and permanent. Most importantly, no one is convinced it will prioritize the Israeli threat at the top of national and regional security concerns, or that it will not merely be a 'bubble' that quickly swells and floats to the surface, only to deflate and disappear from agendas.

Seventh: For years, there have been calls urging weighty Arab states, alongside Turkey and Iran, to form a regional system for security and cooperation that would lay the groundwork for a joint defense strategy (a genuine one if possible). But many Arab capitals view Iran – not Israel – as the enemy and threat, and Turkey advancing into the Mashriq, North Africa, and the Red Sea as the threat to thwart before others, especially since both have extensions in the countries in question. Iran is seen as extending influence through 'auxiliary forces,' while Turkey is perceived as doing so through the Muslim Brotherhood. These factors have prevented and may continue to prevent a change in the rules of the game. In fact, until very recently (and perhaps, for some, still today), Arabs preferred to ally with Israel under U.S. leadership to counter the Iranian 'crescent' and influence and or to contain neo-Ottomanism.

Eighth: This does not absolve Iran and Turkey – the two regional neighbors – from responsibility for the failure to build a regional security and cooperation system. Both have imperial, interventionist, and expansionist legacies. But today we point to what unites them with the weighty Arab states that are beginning to sense the grave dangers in the rise of fascism in Israel. Israel strikes left and right, unchecked and unrestrained. Iran is in a state of 'neither war nor peace' with Israel, as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution describes it, while Ankara is on a collision course with Tel Aviv, not only in Syria, but also over the genocidal war in Gaza. And now the Cyprus file has reopened following reports of the island acquiring advanced Israeli air defense systems, which Turkey perceives as a threat to Turkish Cypriots. Israel is the epicenter of evil in the region and has hostile relations with its various peoples and nations. The time has come for a system of security, defense, and cooperation to confront it. It is time to set aside secondary disputes in order to face this primary conflict with the enemy.

Ninth: This does not conflict with Arab states' efforts to develop defense relations with parties outside the region, nor with efforts to include regional actors such as Pakistan in this system, whether during or after its formation. But the 'logic of priorities' dictates starting first with those who have an immediate and pressing interest in curbing Israeli aggression and halting the arrogance and violations that threaten all.

Tenth: It is time Arab governments and rulers realized that Arab national security cannot remain 'borrowed' or imported from abroad. Arab national security must arise from within the Arab core itself, relying on Arab capacities. The time has come to move decisively from dependency to self-reliance. This is a matter of existence, of life and death. Either we exist, or we remain playthings in the calculations of international patrons of the past and regional patrons of the future. Again, this does not mean isolationism or shutting the doors to attempts at building power through partnerships and alliances with weighty regional players like Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But the compass must remain clear, with a roadmap and its interconnected circles and well-known logical priorities always present.