Articles - Others - Date: 2025-06-16

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

Israel's war on Iran is still far from the finish line and may not have even reached its peak yet," asserts leading Jordanian commentator 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Amman daily al-Sabeel.The parties involved, whether directly or indirectly, have set lofty and perilous objectives, so consequential that one can say this war may shape the region's future for years or decades to come, redefining its power balances and dynamics and perhaps also its borders.

 

From the Israeli perspective, the shocking opening strike of this war, along with the prior military, political, logistical, and intelligence preparations spanning one or two decades, reveals that Tel Aviv is plotting for much more than merely inflicting a 'chronic impairment' on Tehran's nuclear program. Beyond dismantling the program à la Libya, the goal is to defang the Islamic Republic by neutralizing its ballistic and hypersonic capabilities, opening the door for a shift from a strategy of effecting policy change to one of regime change. Israel is no longer concealing the objectives of its war against Iran. There is no need for intelligence reports or strategic analysts to decipher them, as they are now declared openly and publicly. It would be wise to take these declarations seriously and not be lulled by wishful thinking or false hopes.

Israel is recycling aspects of its previous wars against Arabs and Palestinians in this campaign against Iran: 'Strategic deception', 'shock and awe' like in June 1967, starting the war with 'decapitation strikes' as in Lebanon, and 'strategic security breaches'. To that end, it is heavily employing terms like 'permissible violence' and 'the Dahiyeh doctrine," and has even already begun discussing 'the day after' in Iran. Israel has opened channels of communication with remnants of the deposed Shah's regime and various armed opposition groups, both inside and outside Iran, including separatists and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. I believe the Mossad would not have been able to achieve such breakthroughs on the ground by relying solely on its own capabilities; rather, it is likely leveraging these groups which have wider reach and mobility within Iran.

This does not mean, of course, that Israel will achieve everything that it aspires to. It all depends on several conditions that may deepen the rift between plans and outcomes. First and foremost is Iran's ability to endure, regain the initiative, and rebuild a balance of deterrence and symmetry in its confrontation with Israel. The second factor is the willingness of the U.S. specifically to expand its involvement in the war by striking targets that Israel's military machine cannot reach and inflicting severe damage on the bulwarked sites underpinning Iran's nuclear project.

So far, four days into the war, neither condition appears to have materialized for the most extreme right-wing administration in Israeli history. Tehran has not raised a white flag; quite the opposite. It has held firm and steadfast, recovered swiftly, and begun to restore a balance of deterrence. Meanwhile, Washington is not aligned with Tel Aviv's extremely high expectations, content with a lower bar, although it does not object to joining Tel Aviv in pursuing these objectives if a viable opportunity presents itself to achieve the quickly and with low military and economic costs.

From the U.S. perspective, Washington once accepted Iran retaining low-level uranium enrichment (3.6%) for peaceful civilian uses, under stringent verification and inspection conditions. These were the terms of the 2015 Vienna deal, before Trump's first administration unilaterally withdrew and his second administration returned to push for zero enrichment on Iranian soil. The U.S. shares Israel's concerns over Iran's missile program and its so-called 'destabilizing role in the region', which has now become a standard phrase in both U.S. and several European foreign policy statements.

Washington – whose president rode into office on promises to achieve peace everywhere, across various fronts and crises, driven by his ambition for a Nobel Peace Prize – has no wish to get embroiled in a major Middle East war, nor does it assign the same weight to Tel Aviv's fears and concerns. However, the president's behavior is marked by impulsiveness and frivolity, often taking an ignorant and simplistic approach to the most complex and sensitive crises, where past and present, culture and geopolitics intertwine. His constant stream of threats and ultimatums and tendency to impose arbitrary deadlines has led to a failure in managing most of these files, from Gaza to Ukraine, and now Iran and Israel. These failures have been masked by claims of successfully preventing or halting wars on other fronts: Between India and Pakistan, and recently, Egypt and Ethiopia (?!!)

True, the Trump administration has, in its approach to a few crises in our region, exhibited somewhat of a departure from Israel's priorities and Netanyahu's calculations, as in the case of the Syria dossier and opening up to the new regime, or establishing direct contact with Hamas against Israel's wishes, or striking a deal with Ansarullah in Yemen and exiting the senseless war against a country exhausted by internal and external conflict. Nevertheless, the Trump administration continues to reaffirm its commitment to the Israeli agenda on more pivotal issues, particularly Iran and Gaza. Even when their preferences diverge, the U.S. tends to fall back in line with the Israeli rhythm.

This question looms large in the minds of politicians and observers across the region and the globe. In my view, to dismiss this scenario would be unwise, as it could materialize under one or both of these conditions: First: If Iranian and allied retaliation to the Israeli aggression spirals out of control, targeting U.S. bases, assets, or interests in the region. Then, widescale intervention will be inevitable, backed by the broadest U.S. political and institutional consensus, with virtually guaranteed European support, especially from the London/Paris/Berlin 'Troika'.

Second: If Washington believes Israel is in real danger, beyond the level of the daily damages we have seen and observed so far. If it appears the war could end in an Israeli defeat, undoing the gains of the past 20 months and revitalizing Tehran's axis after the severe blows it suffered following Israel's multi-front wars post-October 7, 2023, then a large-scale U.S. intervention would become the practical embodiment of the promises made not only by Trump and his administration, but by various successive U.S. administrations, to ensure Israel's security, defend it, and maintain its edge.This requires Tehran and its allies to view political and battlefield calculations through this complicated lens and avoid miscalculation. Despite the fiery rhetoric from some Iranian leaders and officials, I do believe that there is a 'cold Iranian mind' currently focused on exactly these calculations.

 

From an Iranian viewpoint, the immediate priority is to repair the damage Israel inflicted on its command, control, and communication systems, having 'cut off the heads' of Iran's security and military establishments and assassinated Tehran's elite scientists and engineers. The next priority is to restore prestige and rebuild a balance of deterrence in fighting the project to turn Tehran into a new Dahiyeh and Isfahan into Khan Younis 2.0. In Iran, no call reverberates more strongly than the call for vengeance, symbolized by red flags raised atop mosques and Hussainiyas. There is no room for direct or indirect negotiations with Israel over a ceasefire, and there is no hurry to resume talks with Trump's administration, Israel's partner in this war. Most crucially, there can be no retreat from the minimal terms accepted in the five rounds of negotiations preceding the war: Enrichment at 3.6% on Iranian soil and recognition of Tehran's legitimate nuclear rights for peaceful civilian purposes, with neither its missile program nor its regional influence being up for discussion.

Any concession on these issues/rights would mean that Israel has triumphed in imposing its terms. It would also mean a crushing victory for Trump, who seeks to use Israel as a bludgeon to break Iranian resistance to his diktats. Iran may go to great lengths to offer guarantees of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and include ample transparency, inspection, and verification protocols in any future deal in exchange for the removal of sanctions, or the bulk of them. Otherwise, it would mean Israel has empowered Trump to declare 'diplomacy through power' victorious over the 'power of diplomacy.

The war is still in its early stages, and it would be risky to predict its conclusion. However, at this point we can define what victory and defeat might look like: Trump wins if he forces Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, leaving only structures with no inherent value without foreign supply chains, which he largely controls. Netanyahu wins if he strips Iran of its nuclear and missile capabilities, and he achieves 'total victory' if he puts the regime change project on track to implementation by activating internal dynamics capable of completing the task, even if it takes a while. Iran wins if it reestablishes a balance of deterrence, even if it is under tougher conditions than before, and preserves the minimum of its nuclear rights, as it has long defined them in countless speeches, statements, and messages. The war continues, and the story is far from over,