Articles - Others - Date: 2025-06-11

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

For the past two weeks, the "Abu Shabab Gang" has dominated political discourse in Gaza, drawing significant attention not only within Palestinian circles but also from Israeli observers. This surge in interest follows the public exposure of the gang’s ties to both the Israeli government and its security apparatus. More alarmingly, threads of connection have emerged linking the gang to Ramallah and figures close to the Palestinian presidency and even to an Arab state reportedly involved in its training and funding.

It is as if a veil has been lifted on an Israeli vision for what is often referred to as the “day after.” The current far-right Israeli government — having effectively shut the door on any meaningful political initiatives to end the war — appears to envision Gaza being run by mafia-style criminal groups. These would be propped up by tribal allegiances and bolstered through the exploitation of the population's extreme suffering. Previous Israeli efforts to create a "local alternative leadership" — drawn from tribal figures, businessmen, and remnants of the old Palestinian security apparatus — failed, even under the guise of coordinating humanitarian aid. Now, attention has shifted to criminal gangs.

Israel’s intense focus on the Abu Shabab Gang reveals the Netanyahu government's deep political bankruptcy — despite its boasts of strategic military and field achievements in Gaza and across support fronts. If "Abu Shabab" is meant to symbolize the "day after," then this project resembles a failed state, a testament to Israel’s lack of vision after nearly two years of war — a war whose rhythm is set by Netanyahu’s narrow, self-interested calculations and those of his far-right coalition. This very critique has already surfaced in Israeli media commentary, following Avigdor Lieberman’s initial disclosure of the affair.

Netanyahu’s defense of his decision to adopt Abu Shabab as a local security proxy — arming and financing the gang — likely stems from one or both of the following reasons. First, his despair in establishing a credible alternative leadership in Gaza that aligns with his vision and does not belong to Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. After repeated failures, he turned to drug trafficking and smuggling gangs with prior ties to ISIS and similar groups. Second, he may be gambling that if this scheme fails to generate a viable alternative, it could still succeed in plunging Hamas and its institutions into armed clashes with criminal mafia gangs, particularly those that specialize in looting humanitarian aid. In either scenario, Netanyahu likely sees himself as a winner.

Unlike many of his allies, Netanyahu appears to be the most enthusiastic advocate for this experiment. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich distanced himself from the decision, denying prior knowledge and expressing disapproval — though he also promised not to turn the issue into a coalition crisis, citing wartime imperatives. Notably, Netanyahu seems the least concerned about the possibility of these weapons backfiring against Israelis, especially once the gang has fully immersed itself in betrayal and conspiracy. This would mirror past collaborators in South Lebanon, who remained loyal to their Israeli handlers even after being abandoned. And on this point, Netanyahu may be right: those who are willing to loot humanitarian aid during wartime, raise arms against the resistance amid conflict, and were nurtured in the occupation’s shadows — under its protection, guidance, and direction — are unlikely ever to turn against their benefactors. They understand full well that the umbilical cord tying them to the occupation state is their only source of sustenance and survival.

This does not mean, however, that Gaza’s people or its resistance forces can afford to downplay the threat posed by this gang (and I do not believe they do). The context surrounding the gang’s formation suggests that it could become a serious challenge — both now and in the aftermath of the war. Four key reasons prompt this warning:

First, the suffering of Gaza’s population has reached a level that would crush mountains. History has shown — in many places and times — that desperate people will cling to any glimmer of hope, no matter how frail, even if it is extended by enemies or untrustworthy actors. In such cases, survival instincts may override all other considerations, at least temporarily.

Second, there appear to be figures in Ramallah who are willing to support this gang. Some reports suggest direct involvement in its formation and funding, and calls have been made for remnants of the Palestinian security apparatus to join it. While the Palestinian Authority has officially denied any ties, backchannel communications and coordination reportedly exist, including through security officials with Islamist backgrounds who have since turned against their origins. In fact, the gang’s own leader has publicly acknowledged cooperation with Palestinian security forces. It would not be surprising if, in the event that the gang survives and grows, some in Ramallah declare it a new security branch — or revive an old one under its name. In such a scenario, the gang could become a new Trojan horse, replacing past failed infiltration attempts carried out under the guise of aid and in coordination with Israeli intelligence (Shin Bet). If this is indeed the case, the threat posed by the gang becomes all the more grave.

Third, Israel appears to be exploiting the notion of “secondary identities” in Gaza by presenting the gang as a representative of specific clans and families. It is conceivable that the authorities might recruit clan extensions within Israel's borders to agitate against the resistance. Israel has prior experience doing so with Druze factions in Lebanon and Syria — why not attempt it in Gaza, even if the actors are different? Recruiting some members of these communities in the army, security agencies, and the Mista'arvim [undercover Arabic-speaking special forces]. There is little stopping Israel from trying to reproduce this model once more.

Fourth, Netanyahu’s quest to create a criminal alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza seems to have support from certain Arab and international actors. Reports of an Arab state’s involvement are troubling, and U.S. statements in support of the initiative — under the pretext of safeguarding and distributing humanitarian aid — also raise concerns.

These factors help explain how the gang emerged and spread so quickly, as well as the attempts to extend it beyond eastern Rafah. The gang's recent calls for volunteers across various governance and administrative fields suggest the matter goes beyond Abu Shabab, and that Israel's dangerous, malicious meddling may be backed by Palestinian, Arab, and international actors. What started with Abu Shabab and his gang may evolve far beyond the current weak structure

This underscores the urgent need to deal firmly with the Abu Shabab Gang and uproot it before it grows stronger. All of this demands urgent, forceful action to uproot the gang before it grows stronger. The resistance factions have already made this clear and are currently in the process of partially achieving it, despite the severe constraints they face. However, this must be a collective task, not that of one faction alone.

Countering this phenomenon cannot rely solely on security measures — though these are essential. What is also needed is a broad-based popular mobilization to confront the gang and deny it any measure of public support, however limited. Its goals, connections, and motives must be exposed. A multi-pronged response — strategic, political, social, and security-based — is essential to defeating Netanyahu’s vision for “the day after.” This fight is inseparable from the battle over Gaza’s present and future — and, indeed, over the fate of the entire Palestinian national project.