Articles - Others - Date: 2022-06-12
Source: Erem News

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

The latest round of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, which revolved around the Flag March, ended with a loss for the Palestinian side, not due to an unwillingness to fight and make sacrifices, especially from the millennial generation, but due to the poor performance of its leaders, factions and institutions. The Palestinians lost a battle, but they did not lose the war, and they lost by a matter of points, and not with a technical knockout, to use a boxing term.

 

Now that the dust has settled and hot heads have cooled, it is necessary to reflect on the takeaways and lessons learned, in hopes that it will provide more rationality to the discourse and more wisdom to practice:

 

First: To tone down talk of 'reversing the scene', 'changing equations', and 'changing the rules of engagement'. Reaching equal footing with the enemy does not happen so lightly, and a balance of mutual deterrence is not built with a rocket count or range calculations. It requires redefining sources of strength and power and building them on inclusive foundations that recognize all components and constituents of the Palestinian people at home and abroad.

 

Second: To make promises and commitments that can be fulfilled, not that one wishes to fulfill, and to avoid getting caught up in the 'fever of podiums and microphones' as much as possible. Raising expectations is much worse than lowering them; it leaves people disappointed and frustrated and creates a domino effect. It is far easier to lose confidence than to recover it.

Third: To avoid reducing the resistance to one approach. The peaceful popular Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem and areas within the Green Line and in the West Bank is no less important than launching hundreds of rockets. Overinflating a specific form of resistance keeps the entire people in limbo, awaiting others to do the job for them, including at times when the latter are unable to pull the trigger.

 

Fourth: To avoid reducing the entire Palestinian cause to al-Aqsa Mosque. Despite the importance and sanctity of the site, it is unacceptable to reduce the cause to it. Under a barrage of smoke bombs, Israel is carrying out dangerous, heinous settlement expansion operations in Jerusalem and its surrounding and inside the West Bank. What will remain of al-Aqsa's Arab and Muslim identity if Jerusalem and the West Bank lose theirs to encroaching settlement, annexation, displacement, and expulsion?

 

Fifth: For all the importance of focusing on the connection and interdependence of the various components of the Palestinian people in their various locations, the equation linking Gaza to Jerusalem, and later Gaza to Jenin, involves a lot of rash exaggeration. Gaza has been under siege for over 15 years, buckling under the fires of wars and aggression. It is not required to 'represent' the Palestinian people or shoulder a burden beyond its and its people's capacity or ability to bear. Although no one can deny the patriotic, national, religious and human sentiments that connect it to Jerusalem and al-Aqsa and what they stand for, there is a casualness in citing these issues that the senior officials in Gaza responsible for decisions of war and peace are guilty of.

 

Sixth: The most dangerous consequence of getting caught up in 'the fever of podiums and microphones' is that it may drive those affected by it to embark on ill-considered escapades, if only to 'preserve credibility and save face'. The decision to go to war requires cool heads and calm nerves, free of fatal populism and the clamor of podiums and rallies.

 

Seventh: The extreme political, geographical, and institutional divide and the deep interests that have grown from its trunk are capable of eroding and squandering the Palestinian people's gains. This happened last year in the wake of Operation Sword of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem uprising as well as before it, and may happen again unless a permanent end is put to this shameful, disturbing scourge.

 

Eighth: The Palestinian political system's aging and its persistent structural incapacity make it a heavy burden on the national movement and the popular resistance. The PA, which is absent and excluded from circles of decision and action, is transforming from an asset for the people to a burden on their shoulders. Unless there is a reassessment of its function and the justification for its existence, and unless it is reformed and democratized, it will most likely turn into a machine for perpetuating the occupation, facilitating its survival and minimizing its costs. This is the last thing that the Palestinians need, when they already feel betrayed and abandoned and are more united than ever around the belief that no one can scratch one's itch better than oneself.