Articles - Others - Date: 2022-04-09
Source: Erem News

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

A report in Turkish daily Hurriyet revealed that deliberations are underway in Ankara's decision-making corridors to reevaluate the Turkish stance towards the Syrian crisis and the Assad regime.

 

It is not unlikely for a major U-turn to take place in the AKP [ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party] regime's Syrian policy, consistent with the series of recent U-turns in Turkish relations with regional and neighboring countries, inspired by the 'zero problems' doctrine afforded renewed consideration today after a decade of shunning it and its architect, Ahmet Davutoglu. The report, which received wide coverage and triggered an endless torrent of speculation and interpretations, entails a great deal of realism in light of the shift in Turkish foreign policy priorities in the past two years. Indeed, rationality requires a Turkish volte-face on the Syrian track, complementing similar turnabouts on the Emirati, Saudi, Egyptian and Israeli tracks, reaching the Armenian and Greek fronts.

 

Since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ambitions of praying in Damascus' Umayyad Mosque as a conquering invader were crushed, Turkey's dreams in Syria have diminished. Today, its interests are virtually reduced to three: First, hunting down the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) Second, preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity in northern Syria. Third, getting rid of the heavy burden of the Syrian refugees, which threatens Erdogan's chances and prospects during next year's elections, marking the centennial of the Republic.

 

In a previous article, we said that there is much more that unites Erdogan and Assad in Syria than divides them, despite the huge rift separating the two men and their regimes, and despite the smear campaigns that dominate their propaganda and politics. Both Assads, father and son, cooperated with Ankara before and after the AKP came to power to 'cleanse' Syria from any PKK presence. Since the 1998 Adana Agreement between the two countries, Damascus has not had any significant lapses in respecting its obligations towards Ankara. Returning to this policy is possible, and indeed very possible, if the doors open to reconciliation and settling disputes between the two neighboring countries.

 

To a greater extent than Erdogan, Assad has been vowing to veto the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. He has become fed up with the civil Autonomous Administration [Rojava] the Kurds established in the North, and indeed, does all he can to incite the Arab clans against it and considers it a guise to maintain the 'U.S. occupation' in those areas. The efforts of Moscow and Hmeimim base to mediate between Damascus and Qamishli have constantly clashed with Damascus' inflexibility in the pre-2011 phase on one side and the high bar of the Kurds' expectations and stakes on the other.

I believe that it will be easier for Ankara and Damascus to reach an agreement on the Kurdish movement's future in Northern Syria than on any other dossier that may figure on the agenda of later negotiations between the two sides, and I believe Turkey knows this and is betting on it.

 

For their part, the Syrian refugees, whom Erdogan welcomed with open arms in the hopes that they would be an asset to his Syrian project and a pressure card on Greece and the EU, have become a burden that may be the Achilles heel of his electoral campaign. The regime in Damascus does not display enthusiasm for the refugees' return, but it also does not object to their return, especially if it occurs in an orderly manner pursuant to an agreement with the Turks.

 

Ankara is turning over a new leaf in its ties with Arab capitals, most of which want Syria to return to the fold. It realizes that one of the requirements for such U-turns is to reshuffle the cards of the Syrian opposition and coalition in such a manner as to diminish its significance. This has already been started, first with the recent closure of the opposition's Ankara offices, and second and more importantly, with the consequent decline in the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance over it.

 

So why should we find the Hurriyet report surprising and not consider its contents to be an installment in a broader, larger context?