Articles > > Bashir's Tools

Articles - Addostour - Date: 2019-06-04
By: Oraib Al Rantawi

Sudan's generals have left none of the means or tools that [deposed president] 'Omar Hassan al-Bashir used to stay on Sudan's throne for thirty years untried or untested, starting with the policy of 'divide and rule' when dealing with the popular movement led by professionals, to using the former regime's militias, to appealing to the danger of lawlessness, conspiracies, and foreign enemies, but not ending with resorting to brute force to disperse the protests.
Not only that, Sudan's new military rulers have unilaterally decided that they will maintain and even expand their hold on power, and are striving to build a social base for a long-lasting rule presided over by powerful militias and factions, thereby placing themselves firmly in the counterrevolutionary camp opposing the Arab Spring and its uprisings on the map of regional alliances. It is all over in their minds, and the only thing left is to get rid of the protesting crowds gathered outside the armed forces' [Khartoum] HQ.
These generals are Bashir's disciples and the 'orphans' left in his wake who grew up in his era and would never have reached their ranks and positions had it not been for their loyalty to him. They know no other mode of governance than his own, and have learnt his tricks and tools, having themselves been used as some of the instruments in his executive toolkit. They employed evasive and stalling tactics in hope that the protesting crowds would disperse or divide from within, while they established their alliances with the regional counter-revolutionary camp before deciding to take a stand and crack down on the popular uprising.
Their claims of being part of the Sudanese people's revolution are no more than lies; they hijacked it so as to prevent the regime's fall and limit the damage to that of deposing some of its figureheads, replacing one general with another. This is their mission, and they have received open political and financial support from capitals that are known to all [Riyadh and Abu Dhabi]. Their talk of ruling with temperance and their promises to hand over power to a civilian government are also nothing more than lies, with no function other than to deceive the outraged masses and reassure the international community so as to contain its reactions. They want Sudan to remain in the generals' clutches, and to recreate the path of their great leader [Bashir] who taught them all their tricks. The Sudanese have come to realize this belatedly, perhaps, but not before it is too late.|

The events in Khartoum's protest squares, from occupying the city and blocking its intersections, to street chases and activist assassinations with bullets, smoke bombs, and batons are the true expression of the [military's] internal thought process. That is the only truth that speaks to them, plain and simple, and those are their intentions, without exaggeration.
The Sudanese people overthrew 'Omar al-Bashir, whose rule both they and he believed would last forever, after which they toppled General Ibn 'Auf at record speed. Today, Sudan's battle for a democratic civil state enters its third chapter, and the Sudanese people are raising slogans to overthrow a third leader. They have no choice but to win this battle, or risk subjecting their country to several more decades of rule under the generals' banner.
The counterrevolution in Sudan is unfolding in chapters, with its domestic strains intertwining with the regional strains, exposed for all to see. However, the Sudanese people have yet to have their final say. The battle for freedom and democracy has not yet ended, and the military council whose leaders have heard the provocative talk of cracking down on the street should realize that its path is fraught with danger, and that the empty rooms adjacent to 'Omar al-Bashir's throne room are harboring all those who seek to tamper with the future of the Sudanese people and the lives of their sons and daughters.
Those who have not learned from the experience of the last few months in Sudan will never learn, and indeed are incapable of learning to begin with.
And those who have turned against this kind-hearted and great people's revolution will live to regret it, but only when their remorse will be of no avail.